

Intelligence tools for scenario planning

It is late at night. The darkened room is full of small tables. Small groups of people huddle around them, some peering at high-resolution photos while others read and collate messages from a high-speed printer. Two or three powerful-looking individuals pace the floor, frequently stopping to watch a situation board update overhead. Suddenly, the door flies open. A heavy-set man stops before one of the pacing individuals, chest heaving. He salutes, and hands over a message. "We have confirmation," he says. The tall, silver-haired commander moves quickly. "Go to code red," he says, as the message board updates, showing new information. "Activate plan Alpha. We're changing our source for curly-leafed lettuce."

Except for those last seven words, this scene might have come from a host of Hollywood movies. In that world, leaders eye the future with a calm and steady gaze. Top-level strategists integrate rich intelligence about target capabilities and intent in a daring action plan. Information developed through bold acts of espionage fills remaining gaps in knowledge. Commanders choose a course, and then monitor unfolding events to see which of several scenarios might develop. Using fresh intelligence, they select one of several previously developed contingency plans (each scenario has several), and aggressively execute the plan – either winning the day, or yielding an opportunity for an intelligence analyst-cum-hero to save the day with a combination of savvy, cunning, gut feel, and sheer luck. Then the entire organisation – or heroic portions of it – lines up in support.

However, in the real world, strategy development is constrained by past and existing corporate cultures. When scenarios are developed, they often rely on a sense of what is 'believed' about the external world. They rarely use much intelligence that might be recognisable as such by experts from the arenas of national security or defence. Even more rarely are scenarios interpreted in a way that leads to direct action, or that evaluates past action to feed development of yet further scenarios. Finally, where scenarios are successful in engaging the corporate imagination, they often fail to keep employees and staff aligned long enough to reach 'the promised land'.

What is wrong here? There are four strong clues that traditional scenario work may not be enough:

1. Traditional scenario planning cannot deal with change without continual new data, and a good process for interpreting it. If successful, scenarios can get both management and key technical staff onto the same 'page', but then must struggle to keep them there, in the face of constant change, long enough to make the deep cultural changes that achieving 'future vision' usually requires.
2. Good scenarios help corporate leaders imagine the future, but often can't help the rank-and-file align to make the cultural changes needed for that future to happen. This is especially true since the ideal future is something often depicted as happening later, 'outside' of the company, while today's work gets evaluated today.
3. Leaders, consultants and others do much initial scenario planning in isolation from any detailed connection to the external environment.
4. Once the initial scenarios are formulated, they often fail to employ a rigorous system to objectively measure the emergence of either anticipated, or unexpected new conditions.

What goes wrong: evidence behind the clues

- **First clue**

Ironically, constant, tumultuous change may be the distinguishing characteristic of the modern marketplace. Too often, the work done by good scenario planners may still result in a snapshot of a single point of time, rather than a 'movie'. Even if the company agrees on what lies outside (and just ahead), new information is constantly required to interpret the impact of new and discontinuous changes. Without this information, significant portions of the company team lose too much faith in the initial scenarios to keep using them.

- **Second clue**

Backing for the second clue lies in the failure of scenarios alone to keep people focused on the external environment. Once the scenario is created, most organisations revert to 'dedicated navel gazing' – a hypnotic focus on the organisation's own current production, products, customers, costs, and results. Much of the 'business intelligence' software developed over the past 20 years attempts to mine numeric data about the company's own transactions to predict the future. (this is not the sort of business intelligence this article addresses!). This internal focus is natural, since most companies don't connect company performance in external markets to employee compensation (unless the employees involved are salespeople or top executives). Furthermore, most scenarios describe an external future vision, not an internal one. Thus, scenarios often give employees a direction, but no map and no landmarks.

- **Third clue**

Here we find a common disconnection between strategist and 'doer' – between those that compose, and those that execute the strategy. Very often, there is a sense in organisations that executives compose and then impose strategies: they make them in a cerebral vacuum, surrounded by consultants and acolytes, where their ability to 'see' is hindered by their altitude and distance from the very external environment in which the strategy must operate.

- **Fourth clue**

Backing for the fourth clue is found in the continuing disconnection that persists between emerging scenarios, intelligence collection, and the detailed, gritty action plans that connect them to action. It is my observation that despite an excellent effort to identify and trap weak and incipient market signals into the narrative framework of scenarios, there seems to be little ability or interest in decomposing scenario elements in a way that permits analysts to test their objective existence. It is as though a searcher for the Yeti, based his research solely on stories told in the high Himalayas, but made no serious effort to search for fur, footprints, or dung.

All four of these clues connote the sense of an ivory tower; a sort of distance between scenarios built (or the people that build them), and the real world, and those workers in close connection with it. This 'strategic' distance has two serious implications. First, insulated strategists frequently rely upon only secondary and syndicated research in the composition of scenarios and strategies, missing the rich, detailed context that primary source information provides. In the business intelligence paradigm of which we will speak, much of this primary information could come from their own employees – not from expensive, specially commissioned research projects. Second, by constructing scenarios and strategies without a deep involvement of the rank-and-file, planners risk alienating the large majority of normal employees – key stakeholders who must make the strategist's future vision their own, if they are to make it real.

Can business intelligence help?

For all the cases listed above, business intelligence may hold an answer. For the purposes of this article, I'll define business intelligence as the collection and analysis of predictive, entity-specific, (mostly) primary source information, with techniques originating in the world of national security (I'll give a more thorough definition later). For this article, it is my thesis that the discipline of business intelligence helps scenario builders and others move from scenarios to compelling strategies that engage the support of both executives and the workforce at large.

Business intelligence does this by:

1. A disciplined intelligence process to collect and process external information can help generate both the intelligence needed and the continuing internal alignment necessary to apply scenario-spawned visions to a changing external environment.
2. Business intelligence can become an integrative 'thread' running through scenario planning, role-playing/business wargaming, strategy formulation, and implementation. Only by using intelligence appropriately within and throughout

each of these processes, is it possible to be certain that scenario work connects with successful plans and decisions within an objective reality.

The Criticality of Alignment

The first problem cited is the most significant. Many have already noted that discontinuous change makes systematic planning difficult. Harry Mintzberg points out that the 'announced' and deliberate strategy of many organisations is rarely the strategy that eventually emerges¹. Paraphrasing Hume², Mintzberg notes that strategies: "May result from human actions, but not from human designs." Human designs rely upon patterns and extrapolations that may not hold up in the face of new technologies, players, rules, or other unexpected twists of the global market.

In the face of disruptive, discontinuous changes, some thinkers advocate that scenario planning is a process from which two issues result: deeper understanding of trends and rivers that can inform all aspects of strategic thinking, and some level of alignment in purpose at least among the top levels of the company. From this point of view, the process by which scenarios are developed and discussed is more important than the scenarios themselves. Strategic dialogues emerging from the process of futures thinking are the real 'fruit' of the scenario process.

Once leaders are aligned, however, the job is only partly done. Rank-and-file employees may still defend old regimes, and their own positions within them. Ironically, the very act of announcing a shift in vision may solidify opposition to that vision. Once leaders choose to act, the battle is joined. Suddenly, opponents to that future arise in every corner of the organisation. Professionals, managers and unions with interests embedded in the status quo, arise to challenge the future vision.

One reason for this clash lies in the fact that many shifts in future vision require a shift in cultural expectations. Culture helps determine who has power, influence, and prestige, regardless of the lines and blocks of organisation's rationale. If culture is a commonly held set of values and beliefs, the corporate continuance of a pre-existing

values and beliefs within 'threatened' individuals will entirely block needed change, no matter what the leaders command.

One way to overcome this 'blockage' within the enterprise is for leaders to sell the vision through every medium and contact available. This may persuade some, but it is scarcely 'leadership'. It often achieves a sort of alignment of its own, prompting opponents to organise competing visions of the future that they hope will prevail. All too often, one or more of the core leadership team, responding to dissent in the ranks, begins to champion a countervailing strategy. In this midst of the chaos, customers become confused, and competitors often triumph. Even if dictates are finally converted into action, precious time and strategic surprise can be lost.

A non-manipulative or 'non-sales' way forward may be to help each blocking party find new opportunities for themselves within a prescribed future vision. Dr. Clem Bezold of the Institute of Alternative Futures advocates an archetypal approach for scenario planning that explores visionary options: bright futures explicitly expressed in ways that catch the imagination of the larger enterprise. Stephen Denning points out that a positive scenario has a nearly organic value as a story that listeners can easily ingest, metabolise, and use as grist for a vision of their own where they emerge triumphant, their own problems solved.

Let's assume just for a moment that all the first steps work well. Leaders align around a strategic dialogue. Their vision is clearly articulated in a compelling story that engages the hearts and wills of the executing echelons. Now what?

In most cases, what comes next is simply life. A change, a crisis, or just a great opportunity emerges, and partially completed changes are incrementally abandoned. Executives, managers, and line employees shift their focus to the job at hand – and future vision, with all its culture-changing aspects, begins to subside. Focusing attention on the collection of business intelligence can help maintain the necessary external focus. Sometimes, what comes next is simply change. Long after the scenarios have been created, new situations may arise that seem to fall well outside the range of

circumstances envisioned for the scenarios. Without any mechanisms to integrate these situations into the emerging picture, the very validity of the process may be challenged. Business intelligence collection planning processes can help managers better monitor emerging situations, while intelligence assessment models can help them better integrate the results into a robust, living depiction of the new situation, or the new scenario.

What is business intelligence?

To understand how business intelligence tools might help scenario planners, it is necessary to understand:

1. What business intelligence is, and what distinguishes it from traditional business research;
2. How general intelligence planning – especially the Key Intelligence Topic process, and development of internal company source networks – can help extend and deepen the ‘strategic dialogues’ begun in scenario development, into a movement that can help enrich and accelerate efforts at cultural change;
3. What intelligence collection planning is, and how intelligence ‘indicators’ can help connect both good intelligence and good scenario work to the real world.

Business intelligence: product or process?

Strictly speaking, intelligence is both the *product* of careful collection and analysis, and the *process* by which it is produced. Intelligence products provide just the information that is needed to make a decision. They do not provide mere background information; they are the information most crucial in a specific decision.

Examples of intelligence products might include enough detail on competitor cost, pricing, or marketing plans to prepare a targeted response; advance notice of emerging

market threats or specific opportunities; or insight into new regulations or technologies that could completely change the marketing landscape. Deciding which intelligence products to create, from what sources, and for whom are all part of the intelligence process.

What distinguishes intelligence from other business research?

Three main characteristics distinguish intelligence from traditional business research:

1. Intelligence is normally 'entity focused', meaning that it tends to focus on named players in the marketplace, not on mass or generalised trends. This means that intelligence is particularly unsuited for market segmentation studies, for example, but well suited to help convert observations about generalised trends into clear data about specifically emerging threats or opportunities. Good intelligence develops information about the target's intent, not just its capability.
2. Intelligence is normally predictive, or future-focused, although often with only the near-term future in mind. The intent of much intelligence product is to determine the intent and/or likely action/reaction of specific market players, given certain stimulus. This is helpful in business negotiations, acquisition due-diligence, client account or supplier management – or any situation in which the intent or the true capability and condition of a specific market entity must be learned before a company can profitably act.
3. Intelligence is principally based on primary human sources, individuals who are aware of the intent of the target entities, and who have shared some portion of their knowledge with the intelligence collector. It is rare, of course, to get all the right information from one source at one time – intelligence tools are designed to permit the ethical collection and systematic aggregation and analysis of data from many sources, synthesised into a complete picture that is tailor-made to answer the decision maker's questions.

Key intelligence topics and the intelligence cycle: organising principles for intelligence

Before any intelligence can be used, there must be a system for collecting, analysing, and using it. In business intelligence, planning normally begins with key intelligence topics (KITs). These are management-directed focal points for intelligence direction, collection and use. We define KITs as high-level competitive issues requiring management decision or action. KITs typically focus on information needed for strategic issues and decisions, early warning of both opportunities and threats, and key player assessments.

Management may define KITs as:

- Decisions they know they must make in the future;
- Decisions they have routinely made in the past, where an information shortfall is detected;
- Recurrent information needs surrounding a strategic issue or area, where there is insufficient information to frame the decision.

Often, KITs touch on significant strategic issues identical to those identified within the scenario planning process. The development of KITs requires another level of strategic dialogue – one that identifies trends and key drivers that operate within a shorter time frame, expressed through the actions of clearly identified market entities. Just as in scenario planning, dialogue about which intelligence questions are key, and what information suffices to answer them, helps increase corporate alignment for action by focusing attention on the external world through a common intelligence framework.

The guiding model for intelligence production is found in the intelligence cycle (see figure 1). This model delineates how intelligence is 'done' – planned, collected, analysed, and used. It forms the core development concept behind most successful intelligence systems.




figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle Model

According to this model:

- Key decision makers first define intelligence research requirements;
- An intelligence collection plan identifies specific indicators or 'observables' that will either confirm or deny the research hypothesis;
- Secondary and primary research information is collected, normalised, and assessed;
- Intelligence information is analysed to yield the 'so what?' (answering the need);
- The results are distributed to the original requestor and to others that need it;
- The entire process is measured, assessed, and reviewed on a regular basis.

Please note that although the intelligence cycle shown above makes intelligence production seem a single, closed-loop process, it is in fact iterative. Intelligence production requires constant interaction between decision makers and staff, information collectors, analysts, and intelligence consumers.

The role of the collection plan

Intelligence collection plans convert the planner's hypothesis into a series of indicators to be confirmed or invalidated through observations in the external world. This process can begin with an 'assessment model' depicting an hypothetical end-state: and end with a fine-grained collection plan that predicts precisely what indicator states collectors must observe to validate that end-state. By offering a way to decompose high-level concepts into objectively testable indicators, intelligence assessment models and collection planning tools offer ways to test alternate 'views' of reality – a great boon to scenario planners.

In general, intelligence collection plans normally consist of several elements. First comes a full description of the task that includes a delineation of what categories of data elements are necessary to fulfil the task, and indications of how much information might be considered sufficient in each category. In intelligence, the definition of that information that is both 'necessary and sufficient' by information class provides thresholds or indicator groups that help ensure that only that information which *must* be collected *is* collected, helping avoid superfluous effort.

Two more elements follow: A description of what sources must be tapped to obtain the desired information, and a description of the resources and methods the collector plans to use in tapping those sources. As work proceeds, the collection plan then helps to determine the sufficiency of the data collected, and helps to revise the approach when necessary.

Indicators in scenario planning

Indicators play a key role in developing collection plans. They can also play an integral part of Scenario planning. In Peter Schwartz's work, *The Art of the Long View*³, he states that the eighth and final step for scenario development lies in selecting leading indicators and signposts. He says:

"It is important to know as soon as possible which of several scenarios is closest to the course of history as it actually unfolds... it's worth spending time and imagination on identifying a few indicators to monitor in an ongoing way. If scenarios have been built according to the previous steps, then the scenarios will

be able to translate movements of a few key indicators into an orderly set of industry-specific implications.”

Nothing I've found in the scenario planning literature suggests either how indicators work, how one might go about investigating whether or not they have been 'tripped', or how one might associate sets of them together to assess the cumulative impact of several of them 'tripping' at once. Those very concepts emerge, however, from indications and warning theory, an integral aspect of intelligence.

The basic concept here is easy. We can't monitor the known universe, so what should we monitor, why, and how do we monitor it? And what system can we apply to interpret our observations? Enter the situation assessment model.

Situation assessment models and collection planning

Situation assessment models help analysts graphically portray, decompose, and test planning assumptions and presumed end-states. Situation assessment models assume that:

1. Scenarios, hypotheses, key intelligence topics, and plans are built on assumptions;
2. Assumptions and hypotheses can be visually expressed;

- Each such expression can be decomposed into elements testable in the real world.




Figure 2: The Assessment Model

An assessment model is a hierarchical aggregation of anticipated events and supporting trends that permits subjective weighting of some relationships over others to enable an expression of the relative import of those relationships. Within this model, end or leaf nodes connect directly to observable events in the external world; top-level nodes represent only the conclusion or end-state, and ranks of intermediate assessment nodes serve to aggregate the observed effects of leaf nodes. In collection planning, this model can be represented on paper (with or without calculated weighting of relationships), or in software (Excel or other software, such as Delfin System's Intelliscope⁴).

How assessment models work

The top level node in the assessment model is the conclusion node. The first step in building an assessment model is to assert a specific end state as the conclusion node. Hence, one doesn't assert what might happen, but what (in future hindsight) has happened. Thus, one might assert, for instance, that a competitor has developed a fabulous new technology, commercialised it, and licensed for specific markets; or that

desktop productivity applications have exploded while information exchange standards have deteriorated after the Microsoft meltdown.

The second, third (and so on, down to penultimate) levels in the assessment model are populated by assessment nodes. These nodes express subordinate concepts that support the end-state or conclusion node. Hence, if Microsoft has melted down, what specific conditions led to that end-state? Answering assessment nodes express conditions that must exist to support the end-state concept as true. Hence, supporting assessment nodes might include events such as: "Federal courts re-affirm Microsoft break-up order," but also: "Venture capitalists again risk capital on desktop productivity development." Each assessment node can support two or more subordinated assessment nodes expressing related, subordinate concepts.

At the bottom of the assessment model are terminal or leaf nodes supporting the lowest tier of assessment nodes. These nodes consist of events or conditions clearly observable in the outside world. As such, they can be confirmed through intelligence collection and analysis. Hence, beneath the assessment node relating to capital in the Microsoft concept expressed above, there may be a leaf node that with a threshold for x amount of venture capital is available. This is an on-or-off condition; once the specified amount of money is reached, that node's conditions are satisfied and the 'on' condition is triggered.

There are two final stages in building an assessment model. The first is to check the rules; the second is to subjectively weight the links between nodes to account for your view of the relative impact of various events. For example, in the Microsoft case, many might consider the availability of capital far less predictive of the end state of wildly proliferating new windows applications than a final U.S. Federal Court order to break up the company.

Some Assessment Model Rules

1. Assessment nodes must support some decision if 'true'.
2. Avoid 'orphaned' nodes or 'single child' subordinate nodes.
3. Account for all major influences on conclusion node; weight links appropriately;
4. Ensure leaf nodes are testable and observable.
5. Presume changes are observable if two or more of the following are true:
 - money changes hands (whenever money changes hands, so does information);
 - Information significantly changes state (significant amounts of data must be normalised, aggregated, analysed, or communicated to create new information);
 - Two or more discrete groups of people must handle data that characterises the change;
 - One or more of those groups must be outside your company.
6. Try for on-off (binary) conditions and thresholding (beware of false positives. Absence of observed activity may only reflect scant information.

Putting it all together

In combining all these steps, an intelligence collection planner might use a process like this:

1. Before anything else, work in concert with the executive(s), to refine business issues or questions into prioritised key intelligence topics. An example would be: "Will the Acme Sports Company begin selling a new exercise product this year?"
2. Decompose each KIT into subordinate questions, or key intelligence questions (KIQs). In the Acme example:
 - Is Acme now developing a new product?
 - Is Acme preparing to market a new product?
 - Is Acme preparing to sell and ship a new product?
3. Decompose each KIQ into observable indicators. To work well, each indicator should:
 - Address a separate aspect of the KIQ;
 - Be mutually exclusive;
 - Observably alter its state in accordance with the presence or absence of a single specific condition;

- Facilitate state change observations whenever on/off conditions or certain thresholds are met.

As an example from the KIQ above, we might develop indicators by first consulting our own product development staff (if we are Acme's head-to-head competitor, for instance) to understand what observable activities we (and by extension, Acme) might engage in. We could also apply our knowledge of past Acme actions. From this analysis, we might develop the following indicators. Has Acme....

- Done focus group research to explore new product feasibility?
 - Purchased the equipment required to manufacture the target product?
 - Contracted with component suppliers for the new product?
 - Hired at least 70 per cent of the workers required to make the new product?
4. Associate all identifiable indicators in an assessment model (see below); then evaluate the model's logic to ensure that no major indicators are missed.
 5. Create an intelligence plan that identifies which information assets, sources, or source types will be tapped for each indicator listed to collect observable data about the state of the indicator.

A graphical depiction of how KITs might decompose into indicators is shown in figure 3.




Figure 3: KITs into indicators

Human source collection for business intelligence

In business intelligence, the best information about competitors, customers, suppliers and others typically comes from people inside your company who already know what you need. The second best information comes from people outside the company that those people know.

This intensive collection of human source information does not require espionage. Done properly, strict rules of ethics are applied to ensure that neither law nor propriety is violated. Using principles of human relationship and communications, it is possible for the skilled collector to build win-win relationships that develop and test a network of sources within targeted and related industries, such as mutual suppliers, customers, regulators, and others, sufficient to ensure that each source:

- Either possesses or has access to those who possess the desired information;
- Is likely to provide the information required in an accurate, reliable way;
- Is willing to provide information without either compromising the collection effort, or engaging in unethical conduct.

In each case, a wise approach begins with the least sensitive sources (that is, vendors, suppliers, and others) and progressively moves closer to the target company as the project progresses.




Figure 4: 'Peeling the onion': source access

Please note that most of this collection is done by people within the company who are already in contact with customers, vendors, and others on the outside. For most people, business intelligence collection and reporting functions simply add on to current work processes. It is rarely necessary to build a large intelligence department. Instead, appropriate intelligence techniques should be interwoven into the daily performance of every job with external market environment contact.

In a fully functioning business intelligence system, many people in the company must be trained to carefully observe the outside world, remember what they observe, and to report their observations to others. Their training emphasises techniques for getting all the data they can from each external transaction. An organised company process then contacts these employees, capturing a broad range of their insights and collected wisdom regarding the competitive environment. Just as scenario planning and the KITs definition work can focus attention on the world outside the company, so this disciplined intelligence collection effort further deepens and enriches corporate

understanding of the external environment throughout the length and depth of the organisation.

Closing the gap

At the outset of this article, I proposed several areas where traditional scenario work may need help. These are:

1. Aligning leaders with a future vision long enough to change the company's direction;
2. Helping rank-and-file employees change internal cultures to meet emerging or future external requirements;
3. More closely connecting scenario planners to the details of the environment, diminishing disconnected 'white board' speculation that may be only loosely grounded in objective reality;
4. Implementing step eight of Peter Schwartz's litany for scenario planners – the deployment of a real system for tracking emerging scenarios.

Business intelligence offers powerful tools for overcoming these deficiencies:

1. Discussion about key intelligence topics picks up where scenarios dialogue leaves off, helping planners move from considerations of the remote future to a more immediate strategy and contingency planning (business wargames – another tool from the national security sector – also offer considerable help here, by enabling executives to play the part of key competitors, customers, and suppliers).
2. Rank-and-file intelligence training, and incented intelligence collection, helps middle and lower corporate echelons align themselves with future vision by

actively contributing to a future-looking, externally-oriented strategy; thus facilitating necessary cultural changes.

3. Disciplined application of strategic intelligence research as part of an on-going system for collecting external information helps better ground each round of scenario planning in external facts.
4. Most importantly, intelligence situation assessment and collection planning techniques provide tools for identifying and linking leading indicators to concerted, forward-looking collection effort.

The thread of intelligence

Integrating Intelligence *Four Key Phases*



Figure 5: Integrating intelligence

At the outset of this article, I suggested that there was a 'thread of intelligence' that could be interwoven throughout the strategic planning process. It may be possible to consider the contributions of business intelligence in terms of a process that begins when an organisation first decides to look ahead with more than casual interest. If scenario planning principles are used, the company may define broad, exploratory scenarios that identify major drivers and key trends – but not yet the entities that will operate within them. During this phase, specialised intelligence can contribute to the investigation of long-term trends (especially through scientific and technical intelligence).

Once there is agreement on the general trends, it may be possible to begin to identify emerging players, and to more concretely flesh out scenarios within which those players have a role (this may also start to happen naturally over time). This is the juncture at which key intelligence topics should be more crisply defined, and assessment models built. Business wargaming can also begin to be effective at this juncture, as the company uses this tool to examine different strategies relative to potentially emerging clients, suppliers, competitors, and so on.

As time progresses, entities that were only dimly visualised over the horizon during the first two steps begin to emerge more clearly. This is where more traditional business intelligence collection and analysis and full-fledged business wargaming, can be very effective.

In the last step, strategies that emerged during initial scenario building processes (the first two steps), and that are completely defined during the third step, are fully implemented and evaluated. As part of this evaluation, planners wisely loop back to step one – and consider broad, exploratory scenarios to examine what else might be coming over the horizon in terms of emerging opportunities and threats.

As in the militaresque story at the beginning of this article, scenario planning and intelligence techniques have long been closely wed with government and military circles, but fairly disjointed within the business world. Much of this is for the good, since some intelligence gathering techniques can only be justified in defence of national security,

not business profits. Nonetheless, the intelligence tools described can help scenario planners connect plans to action, helping companies better anticipate, manage, and exploit the changing market that surrounds them.

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